This article continues study of the prequential framework for evaluating a probability forecaster. Testing the hypothesis that the sequence of forecasts issued by the forecaster is in agreement with the observed outcomes can be done using prequential notions of probability. It turns out that there are two natural notions of probability in the prequential framework: game-theoretic, whose idea goes back to von Mises and Ville, and measure-theoretic, whose idea goes back to Kolmogorov. The main result of this article is that, in the case of predicting binary outcomes, the two notions of probability in fact coincide on the analytic sets (in particular, on the Borel sets).
Background
The prequential framework for evaluating probability forecasters was introduced by A. P. Dawid in [4] and [5] . Suppose two players, Forecaster and Reality, interact according to the following protocol.
Binary prequential protocol FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Forecaster announces p n ∈ [0, 1]. Reality announces y n ∈ {0, 1}. END FOR.
The interpretation is that p n is Forecaster's subjective probability that y n = 1 after having observed y 1 , . . . , y n−1 and taking account of all other relevant information available at the time of issuing the forecast. We will refer to p n as forecasts and to y n as outcomes. More generally, the outcomes take values in an arbitrary measurable space and the forecasts are probability distributions on that measurable space, but in this article we will restrict our attention to binary outcomes (as in [5] ); this will be further discussed at the end of Section 7.
In general, the two players possess perfect information about each other's moves: Forecaster chooses p 1 , Reality observes p 1 and chooses y 1 , Forecaster observes y 1 and chooses p 1 , etc. We might, however, be interested in "oblivious" strategies for a player, especially for Reality, who may generate her moves randomly according to a probability measure on {0, 1} ∞ chosen in advance. On the other hand, the players may also react to events outside the protocol.
Dawid's prequential principle (see, e.g., [4, 5, 6] ) says that when testing the adequacy of the forecaster in light of the outcomes y n we should only use the forecasts p n , not the forecasting strategy (if any) that Forecaster used to produce p n . In this article we will be only interested in testing procedures that respect the prequential principle. In other words, we will be interested in testing the sequence (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .)
of forecast/outcome pairs (p n , y n ) for agreement. This sequence may be infinite or finite. There are two main ways to test sequences (1) for agreement, which we will call game-theoretic and measure-theoretic. For concreteness, suppose the sequence (1) does not satisfy
(i.e., the sequence is not "unbiased in the large"; see, e.g., [6] for numerous other ways of testing probability forecasts). What do we mean when we say that violation of (2) evidences lack of agreement?
Two ways to answer this question correspond to two different approaches to the foundations of probability theory. One version of the game-theoretic answer is that we can gamble against the forecasts is such a way that, risking only one monetary unit, we can become infinitely rich when (2) is violated. The measure-theoretic answer is that, no matter what strategy Forecaster is using, the probability of (2) is one; therefore, if (2) is violated, an a priori specified event of probability zero (given by the negation of the formula (2)) has occurred. Both becoming infinitely rich and the occurrence of a pre-specified event of probability zero can be interpreted as lack of agreement between the forecasts and outcomes.
In fact, even the first answer can be expressed in terms of probability. The game-theoretic approach to the foundations of probability is as old as the standard measure-theoretic based on Kolmogorov's axioms ( [11] ; see [17] for the historical background). An imperfect version of the game-theoretic approach was championed by von Mises [14] and formalized, in different ways, by Wald [24] and Church [2] . Ville [20] gave an example demonstrating that von Mises's notion of a gambling strategy was too restrictive, and introduced a more general class of gambling strategies and a closely related notion of a martingale. However, the formal notion of game-theoretic probability was introduced only recently (see, e.g., [21] , [6] , or, for a much fuller treatment, [16] ). In particular, an event has zero game-theoretic probability if and only if there is a gambling strategy that, risking at most one monetary unit, makes the player infinitely rich when the event happens.
The notion of game-theoretic probability makes the game-theoretic and measure-theoretic justifications of the testing procedure based on (2) look very similar: we just say that the probability (either game-theoretic or measuretheoretic) of (2) being violated is zero. The main result of this article says that the two notions of probability coincide on the analytic sets, and so the two approaches to testing probability forecasts are equivalent, in the prequential framework. The restriction to the analytic, and even Borel, sets is not a limitation in all practically interesting cases.
For testing procedures based on events of probability zero (basically, on strong laws of probability theory, such as (2)), a special case of our result is sufficient: it is sufficient to know that a Borel set has zero game-theoretic probability if and only if it has zero measure-theoretic probability. Our full result is also applicable to events of merely low, not zero, probability. For example, we could reject the hypothesis of agreement if
for prespecified large numbers C and n. Our result shows that this and similar procedures have equally strong game-theoretic and measure-theoretic justifications. Notice that in the case of (3) our decision to reject the hypothesis of agreement can be made after observing a finite sequence, (p 1 , y 1 , . . . , p n , y n ).
This article
In the following two sections, 3 and 4, we formally introduce in the prequential framework the two notions of probability discussed in the previous section. The main result of this article is Theorem 1 in Section 5, asserting the coincidence of the two kinds of probability on the analytic sets. This result has several predecessors. In the situation where Forecaster's strategy is fixed, Ville ([20] , Theorems 1 and 2 in Chapter IV) showed that a set E has game-theoretic probability zero if and only if it has measure-theoretic probability zero. (Ville stated this result in slightly different terms, without explicit use of game-theoretic probability.) This was generalized in [16] (Proposition 8.13) to the statement that game-theoretic and measure-theoretic probability coincide on the Borel sets. In the case of a finite-horizon protocol, a statement analogous to Theorem 1 was proved by Shafer in [15] (Proposition 12.7.4). The special case of Theorem 1 asserting the coincidence of game-theoretic and measure-theoretic probability on the open sets was first proved in [23] (Theorem 2).
In the same Section 5 we also prove that measure-theoretic probability never exceeds game-theoretic probability. This simple statement is true for all sets, not just analytic. The proof of the opposite inequality is given in Section 6. It relies on two fundamental results: Choquet's capacitability theorem [1] and Lévy's zero-one law in its game-theoretic version recently found in [22] .
Some notation and definitions
The set of all natural (i.e., positive integer) numbers is denoted N, N := {1, 2, . . .}. As always, R is the set of all real numbers.
Let Ω := {0, 1} ∞ be the set of all infinite binary sequences and
n be the set of all finite binary sequences. Set Π :
The empty element (sequence of length zero) of both Ω ⋄ and Π ⋄ will be denoted Λ. In our applications, the elements of Ω and Ω ⋄ will be sequences of outcomes (infinite or finite), and the elements of Π and Π ⋄ will be sequences of forecasts and outcomes (infinite or finite). The set Π will sometimes be referred to as the prequential space.
For x ∈ Ω ⋄ , let Γ(x) ⊆ Ω be the set of all infinite extensions of x that belong to Ω. Similarly, for x ∈ Π ⋄ , Γ(x) ⊆ Π is the set of all infinite extensions of x that belong to Π. For each ω = (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ Ω and n ∈ N ∪ {0}, set ω n := (y 1 , . . . , y n ). Similarly, for each π = (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ Π and n ∈ N ∪ {0}, set π n := (p 1 , y 1 , . . . , p n , y n ).
In some proofs and remarks we will be using the following notation, for n ∈ N ∪ {0}: Ω n := {0, 1} n is the set of all finite binary sequences of length n;
i=n Ω i is the set of all finite binary sequences of length at least n;
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for all n ∈ N and all (p 1 , y 1 , p 2 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ Π; the product 0∞ is defined to be 0. If we replace "=" by "≥" in (4), we get the definition of a superfarthingale. These are prequential versions of the standard notions of martingale and supermartingale. We will be interested mainly in non-negative farthingales and superfarthingales.
The value of a farthingale can be interpreted as the capital of a gambler betting according to the odds announced by Forecaster. In the case of superfarthingales, the gambler is allowed to throw away part of his capital.
Game-theoretic probability can be introduced as either upper or lower probability; in this article the former is more convenient (and was used in the informal discussion of Section 1). A prequential event is a subset of Π. The upper game-theoretic probability of a prequential event E is
where V ranges over the non-negative farthingales. It is clear that we will obtain the same notion of upper game-theoretic probability if we replace the ≥ in (5) by >, replace lim sup by sup or lim inf (we can always stop when 1 is reached), or allow V to range over the non-negative superfarthingales. We will need the following property of countable subadditivity of gametheoretic probability. Lemma 1. For any sequence E 1 , E 2 , . . . of prequential events,
In particular, if
Proof. It suffices to notice that the sum of a sequence of non-negative farthingales is again a non-negative farthingale.
Measure-theoretic prequential probability
A forecasting system is a function φ : Ω ⋄ → [0, 1]. Let Φ be the set of all forecasting systems. For each φ ∈ Φ there exists a unique probability measure P φ on Ω (equipped with the Borel σ-algebra) such that, for each x ∈ Ω ⋄ ,
(In other words, such that φ(x) is a version of the conditional probability, according to P φ , that x will be followed by 1.) The notion of a forecasting system is close to that of a probability measure on Ω: the correspondence φ → P φ becomes an isomorphism if we only consider forecasting systems taking values in the open interval (0, 1) and probability measures taking positive values on the sets Γ(x), x ∈ Ω ⋄ . For each sequence (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ Ω ⋄ and each forecasting system φ ∈ Φ, let
Similarly, for each (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) ∈ Ω and each φ ∈ Φ,
We can apply the idea of measure-theoretic probability to prequential events as follows, in the spirit of [9] , Section 10.2. For each forecasting system φ and prequential event E ⊆ Π, define
where E φ := ω ∈ Ω | ω φ ∈ E and P φ (A) is understood, in general, as the outer measure of A, i.e., as inf B P φ (B), B ranging over the Borel sets containing A. The convention about using the outer measure is important only for our proofs, not for the statement of the main result: according to Luzin's theorem (see, e.g., [10] , Theorem 21.10), every analytic set is universally measurable, and E φ is analytic whenever E is. Now we define the upper measure-theoretic probability of E as P meas (E) := sup
Remark 1. Our definition (6) is not fully adequate from the intuitive point of view: even if we are willing to assume that Forecaster follows some forecasting strategy (which is a non-trivial assumption: cf. the discussion in [5] , pp. 1255-1256), why should this forecasting strategy depend only on the past outcomes? For example, a meteorologist forecasting rain might have data about temperatures, winds, etc. (See [5] , Section 9, for further discussion.) A more satisfactory definition would involve a supremum over all probability spaces equipped with a filtration and for each such a probability space a further supremum over all forecasting systems adapted to the corresponding filtration (with a natural more general definition of a forecasting system). Our definition (6) is the simplest one mathematically and leads to the strongest inequality P game (E) ≤ P meas (E) (for the analytic sets), which is the non-trivial part of our main result, Theorem 1.
Main result
Now we are have all ingredients needed to state our main result.
Theorem 1. For all analytic sets
Intuitively, this theorem establishes the equivalence between the purely prequential and Bayesian viewpoints in the framework of probability forecasting. The definition of measure-theoretic probability is Bayesian, in that Forecaster is modeled as a coherent subjectivist Bayesian having a joint probability distribution over the sequences of outcomes (cf. [3] , Section 1); we represent this joint probability distribution as a forecasting system. Rejecting his forecasts is the same as rejecting all forecasting systems that could have produced those forecasts: cf. the sup φ in (6) . The definition of game-theoretic probability is purely prequential, in that it does not postulate any joint probability distribution behind the forecasts; the latter are used for testing directly.
Remark 2. As discussed in the previous section (Remark 1), our Bayesian forecaster is somewhat naive: he conditions only on the observed outcomes. It would be easy (but would complicate the exposition) to allow Reality to issue a signal s n , taking one of a finite number of values, before Forecaster chooses his forecast p n . Allowing both farthingales and forecasting systems to depend on the signals, one could still prove that P game (E) = P meas (E) for all analytic E ⊆ Π following the proof of Theorem 1.
In this section we will only prove the inequality ≥ in Theorem 1. It turns out that this inequality holds for all sets E, not necessarily analytic.
Theorem 2. For all sets
The simple proof of Theorem 2 will follow from Ville's inequality ( [20] , p. 100; in modern probability textbooks this result is often included among "Doob's inequalities": see, e.g., [19] , Theorem VII.3.1.III).
Let φ be a forecasting system. A martingale w.r. to φ is a function V :
for all x ∈ Ω ⋄ (with the same convention 0∞ := 0).
Proposition 1 ([20])
. If φ is a forecasting system, V is a non-negative martingale w.r. to φ, and C > 0,
If V is a farthingale, the function
is a martingale w.r. to φ. It is important that this statement does not require measurability of the farthingale V ; even if V is not measurable, V φ is always measurable, like any other function on Ω ⋄ (which is why there was no need to include the requirement of measurability in our definition of a martingale).
Proof of Theorem 2. Let E ⊆ Π. It suffices to prove that
6 Proof of the inequality ≤ in Theorem 1
We start from proving a special case of Theorem 1.
Proof. Fix a compact prequential event E ⊆ Π. (Of course, "compact" is the same thing as "closed" in this context.) Represent E as the intersection
is satisfied for all i. Informally, E i is a property of the first i forecasts and outcomes. For each i = 1, 2, . . ., define a superfarthingale W i by setting
for all x ∈ Π ≥i and then proceeding inductively as follows. If W i (x) is already defined for x ∈ Π n , n = i, i − 1, . . . , 1, define W i (x), for each x ∈ Π n−1 , by
It is clear that W 1 ≥ W 2 ≥ · · · . Let us check that W i (x) is upper semicontinuous as a function of x ∈ Π ⋄ . By (8) this is true for x ∈ Π ≥i . Suppose this is true for x ∈ Π n , n ∈ {i, i − 1, . . . , 2}, and let us prove that it is true for x ∈ Π n−1 , using the inductive definition (9) . It is clear that f (x, p) := (1 − p)W i (x, p, 0) + pW i (x, p, 1) is upper semicontinuous as function of p ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ Π n−1 . It is well known that sup p f (x, p) is upper semicontinuous whenever f is upper semicontinuous and x and p range over compact sets (see, e.g., [7] , Theorem I.2(d)). A simple proof of a slightly more general fact will be given below in Lemma 3. Therefore,
is an upper semicontinuous function of x ∈ Π n−1 . An important implication of the upper semicontinuity of W i and the compactness of [0, 1] is that the supremum in (9) is attained: it is easy to check that an upper semicontinuous function attains its supremum over a compact set (cf. [8] , Problem 3.12.23(g)). For each i = 1, 2, . . ., we can now define a forecasting system φ i as follows. For each x ∈ Ω n , n = 0, 1, . . . , i − 1, choose φ i (x) such that
(this is an inductive definition; in particular, x φi is already defined at the time of defining φ i (x)). For x ∈ Ω ≥i , set, for example, φ i (x) := 0. The important property of φ i is that W φi i is a martingale w.r. to φ i , and so P φi (E i ) = W i (Λ). Since the set Φ of all forecasting systems is compact in the product topology, the sequence φ i has a convergent subsequence φ i k , k = 1, 2, . . .; let φ := lim k→∞ φ i k . We assume, without loss of generality,
Fix an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. Let us prove that
The restriction of P φi k to Ω iK (more formally, the probability measure assigning weight P φi k (Γ(x)) to each singleton {x}, x ∈ Ω iK ) comes within ǫ of the restriction of P φ to Ω iK in total variation distance from some k on; let the total variation distance be at most ǫ for all
Let us check that lim sup
Indeed, let ω / ∈ E φ iK , i.e., ω φ / ∈ E iK . Since φ i k → φ in the product topology and the set E iK is closed, ω φi k / ∈ E iK from some k on. This means that ω ∈ E φi k iK for only finitely many k, i.e., ω / ∈ lim sup k E φi k iK . From (10) and (11) we can see that
Since this holds for all ǫ, P φ (E φ ) ≥ c. The rest of the proof is easy: since
(the last inequality following from Theorem 2), we have
In the proof of Lemma 2 we referred to the following simple result. The argument in [7] , proof of Theorem I.2(d), is even simpler, but it assumes that X is compact (which is, however, sufficient for the purpose of Lemma 2).
The idea of the proof of Theorem 1 is to extend Lemma 2 to the analytic sets using Choquet's capacitability theorem (stated below). Remember that a function γ (such as P game or P meas ) mapping the power set of a topological space X (such as Π) to [0, ∞) is a capacity if:
• for any subsets A and B of X,
• for any nested increasing sequence
• for any nested decreasing sequence
Condition (14) is sometimes replaced by a different condition which is equivalent to (14) for compact metrizable spaces X: cf. [10] , Definition 30.1. It turns out that both P game and P meas are capacities. We start from P game .
Theorem 3. The set function P game is a capacity.
It is obvious that P game satisfies condition (12) . The following two statements establish conditions (13) and (14) . Condition (14) is easier to check: it can be extracted from the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. We will use the equality P game (E) = lim i→∞ P game (E i ), in the notation of the proof of Lemma 2. This equality follows from
(the opposite inequality is obvious).
and each E i satisfies (7); we will write K n,i in place of E i . Without loss of generality we will assume that
, and so (15) follows from
To check condition (13) for P game , we will need the game-theoretic version, proved in [22] , of Lévy's zero-one law ( [13] , Section 41). For each x ∈ Π ⋄ , define the conditional upper game-theoretic probability of E ⊆ Π by
where V ranges over the non-negative (super)farthingales. Proof. It suffices to construct a non-negative farthingale V starting from 1 that tends to ∞ on the sequences π ∈ E for which (16) is not true. Without loss of generality we replace "for which (16) is not true" by lim inf
where a ∈ (0, 1) is a given rational number (see Lemma 1) . Let π be any sequence in Π; we will define V (π n ) by induction for n = 1, 2, . . . (intuitively, we will describe a gambling strategy with capital process V ). Start with 1 monetary unit: V (Λ) := 1. Keep setting V (π n ) := 1, n = 1, 2, . . ., until P game (E | π n ) < a (if this never happens, V (π n ) will be 1 for all n). Let N 1 be the first n when this happens:
Choose a non-negative farthingale S 1 starting at π N1 from 1, S 1 (π N1 ) = 1, whose upper limit exceeds 1/a on all extensions of
Let N 2 be the first n when this happens. Choose a non-negative farthingale S 2 starting at π N2 from s 1 , S 2 (π N2 ) = s 1 , whose upper limit exceeds s 1 /a on all extensions of π
Let N 3 be the first n when this happens. Choose a non-negative farthingale S 3 starting at π N3 from s 2 whose upper limit exceeds s 2 /a on all extensions of π N3 in E. Keep setting V (π n ) := S 3 (π n ), n = N 3 , N 3 + 1, . . ., until S 3 reaches a value s 3 > s 2 (1/a) > (1/a) 3 . And so on.
Proof. Let A 1 , A 2 , . . . be a nested increasing sequence of prequential events. The non-trivial inequality in (17) is ≤. For each A i the process
is a non-negative superfarthingale (see Lemma 6 below). By Proposition 2, lim sup n S i (π n ) ≥ 1 for almost all π ∈ A i . The sequence S i is increasing, S 1 ≤ S 2 ≤ · · · , so the limit S := lim i→∞ S i = sup i S i exists and is a non-negative superfarthingale such that S(Λ) = lim i→∞ P game (A i ) and lim sup n S(π n ) ≥ 1 for almost all π ∈ ∪ i A i (by Lemma 1). We can get rid of "almost" by adding to S a non-negative farthingale V that starts at V (Λ) < ǫ, for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, and satisfies lim sup n V (π n ) ≥ 1 for all π ∈ ∪ i A i violating lim sup n S(π n ) ≥ 1.
Lemma 6. For any prequential event E, the function
Proof. Suppose there are x ∈ Π ⋄ and p ∈ [0, 1] such that
Then there exists a non-negative farthingale V with lim sup n V (π n ) ≥ 1 for all π ∈ E ∩ Γ(x) that satisfies
and, therefore,
The last inequality implies that there exists j ∈ {0, 1} such that V (x, p, j) < P game (E | x, p, j), which is impossible.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3. Let us now check that measuretheoretic probability is also a capacity.
Lemma 7. The set function P meas is a capacity.
Proof. Property (12) is obvious for P meas . Property (14) follows from Lemmas 2 and 4.
Let us now check the remaining property (13), with P meas as γ. Suppose there exists an increasing sequence A 1 ⊆ A 2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ X of prequential events such that
Let φ be a forecasting system satisfying
, which is equivalent to the
In combination with Choquet's capacitability theorem, Theorem 3 and Lemma 7 allow us to finish the proof of Theorem 1.
Choquet's Capacitability Theorem ( [1] ). If X is a compact metrizable space, γ is a capacity on X, and E ⊆ X is an analytic set,
For a proof of Choquet's theorem, see, e.g., [10] , Theorem 30.13.
Proof of Theorem 1. Combining Choquet's capacitability theorem (applied to the compact metrizable space Π), Lemma 2, Theorem 3, and Lemma 7, we obtain P game (E) = sup
K ranging over the compact sets.
Remark 3. The fact that game-theoretic probability and measure-theoretic probability are capacities has allowed us to prove their coincidence on the analytic sets, and it might be useful for other purposes as well. In general, neither of these capacities is strongly subadditive, in the sense of satisfying
for all prequential events A and B. To demonstrate this it suffices, in view of Theorem 1, to find analytic sets A and B that violate
We can define P game (E) for subsets of Π n by (5) with lim sup n omitted. This is an example of subsets A and B of Π 2 for which (18) is violated:
For these subsets we have
To obtain an example of subsets A and B of the full prequential space Π for which (18) is violated, it suffices to add 00 . . . at the end of each element of the sets A and B defined by (19) and (20) .
Application to the limit theorems of probability theory
The lower game-theoretic probability of a prequential event E is defined to be 1− P game (Π \ E). Similarly, the lower measure-theoretic probability of a prequential event E is defined to be 1 − P meas (Π \ E). The game-theoretic strong law of large numbers (see, e.g., [16] , Section 3.3) implies that (2) holds with lower game-theoretic probability one. The standard martingale strong law of large numbers implies that (2) holds with lower measure-theoretic probability one. Our Theorem 1 establishes the equivalence between these two statements. Similarly, Theorem 1 establishes the equivalence between the game-theoretic law of the iterated logarithm for binary outcomes (a special case of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 in [16] ) and the martingale law of the iterated logarithm for binary outcomes in measure-theoretic probability theory.
Transition from game-theoretic to measure-theoretic laws of probability, corresponding to the inequality ≥ in Theorem 1, depends only on Ville's inequality, and so can be easily done for a wide variety of prediction protocols (see, e.g., [16] , Section 8.1). Transition in the opposite direction, corresponding to the inequality ≤, is more difficult, and its feasibility has been demonstrated only in a very limited number of cases.
In an important respect Theorem 1 is only an existence result. For example, in combination with the standard martingale strong law of large numbers in measure-theoretic probability theory it implies the game-theoretic strong law of large numbers for binary outcomes, but the resulting farthingale is very complex. The corresponding strategy for the gambler (or Skeptic, in the terminology of [16] ) is also very complex. This contrasts with the simple and efficient gambling strategies designed in game-theoretic probability: see, e.g., [16] , Section 3.2, and [12] .
It would be interesting to design efficient general procedures producing simple gambling strategies witnessing that P game (E) = 0 for natural classes of prequential events satisfying P meas (E) = 0. For example, such a procedure might be applicable to all prequential events satisfying P meas (E) = 0 and situated at a given low level of the Borel hierarchy. This would allow an automatic procedure of transition from measure-theoretic to constructive game-theoretic laws of probability: e.g., the set of sequences (1) violating the strong law of large numbers (2) is in the class Σ 0 3 of the Borel hierarchy, and the set of sequences violating the law of the iterated logarithm is in ∆ 0 4 . In this article we have only considered the case where the outcomes y n are restricted to the binary outcome space Y := {0, 1}. It is easy to extend our results to the case where Y is any finite set and Forecaster outputs probability measures on Y , interpreted as his probability forecasts for y n . It remains an open problem whether it is possible to modify our definitions in a natural way so that the equivalence between game-theoretic and measure-theoretic probability extends to a wide classes of outcome spaces and prequential events; this would require imposing suitable measurability or topological conditions on the farthingales (or superfarthingales) used in the definition (5) of game-theoretic probability.
